Kennedy & Johnson (Lincoln)

By Evelyn Lincoln

JFK’s personal secretary offers her insights into the Kennedy-Johnson administration. While obviously partial to JFK, Evelyn Lincoln offers insights into both leaders, their run for the presidency, and their leadership styles.

Lincoln’s observations:

  • Their political battles: “Senator Kennedy had to kill the myth that a Catholic President would be an errand boy for the Pope an would trade the gold in Fort Knox for a supply of holy water; Senator Johnson had to show, somehow, that a Southerner could rise above his region and take liberal positions on vital issues.” (38).

  • Their communication styles: Kennedy “talked about issues, he talked about international affairs, he opened up the world of science and economics to his audience. . . .He used his most effective weapon—his rapier wit—to slash at the Republicans and to make his audience listen intently; he quote poetry to touch their hearts. . . . And he was effective, just as Lyndon Johnson was effective, in combining his public plain-folks technique with the hard back room bargaining and tough explaining of the political realities. 131

On JFK:

  • JFK, the listener: On an LBJ visit to Palm Beach shortly after the election, JFK, LBJ, and House Speaker Sam Rayburn, and Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield were meeting: “Mr. Johnson did most of the talking, Mr. Kennedy did most of the listening, and there were side remarks by Speaker Rayburn.” 10 I record that as it seems from other reading, a JFK strength.

  • JFK endured the heat: Truman was not a fan of Kennedy and let it be known. “Senator, are you certain that youa re quite ready for the country . . . May I urge you to be patient, . . . Are you certain . . . the country is ready for you?” Lincoln: “The harder the blows, the stronger Mr. Kennedy became. That was one of his great strengths.” (69)

On LBJ:

  • LBJ’s favorite Bible verse: “Come, let us reason together.” Isaiah 1:18 25
    LBJ felt, if he were able, he could reason his way to a favorable conclusion if given the opportunity to sit down face-to-face with an opponent.

  • The Johnson treatment: “He would frown, he would smile, he would appeal, and he would use sweet alk. And all of the time he would pound home the theme that they should do it “for good old Lyndon, and for the good of the country. If persuasive adjectives failed, he would his his hands. He would hug the victim, pat him, grip his arm with a cluthc that was as unbreakable, and just about as comfortable as a bulldog’s bite.” (50-51) LBJ. the talker. 113, 114

  • LBJ, the counter: Bobby Baker was his man on this front. “No bill, during Bobby Baker’s time, was ever lost because of an incorrect head-count or because Senators count not be found in time.” 53

  • LBJ image conscious: Lincoln records the words, “Once again, he was thinking of his image” in reference to after John Glenn’s successful space flight and an administration trip to Cape Canaveral. LBJ wanted to fly in Air Force One. JFK was miffed that Johnson was attempting to ride along “again.” 179-180; c.f. 159. “Mr. Kennedy had long ago learned that Mr. Johnson was extremely sensitive and thin-skinned and he tried not to upset him.” 122

  • LBJ, the brilliant legislator: “Everyone knew it was going to be a battle, but the Democrats hoped Mr. Johnson could use his renowned strategical power to pass some worthwhile legislation—for after all that was his greatest asset.” 106

  • LBJ Focused chapters: See Chapter 10, “Mr. Johnson at the White House” and Chapter 11, “The Vice President at Work.”

Leadership maturity:
Lincoln makes an interesting comment on pages 184-185, that speaks to JFK’s growth as a leader. It is also an important point in that all leaders go through their own maturation process in their respective roles. 

Even though Mr. Kennedy had always been the man in charge, from the day that Khrushchev agreed to pull out the missiles, the President had an added ingredient of self-confidence. It seemed as though he had turned the corner and was now going up a different street. He relied more on his own staff and advisers than on the politicians. After the Cuban crisis, Mr. Kennedy seemed to be less concerned with making sure the Vice President was occupied and, from then on, he let Mr. Johnson seek his own place in the administration.

Playing Second Fiddle:

Relationships:
I record this except at length as it reveals the unique and differing relationships between first and second leaders:

One day Senator Dirksen called on Mr. Kennedy. After he left, Mr. Kennedy came out to my desk and said, “Do you know what the Senator told me today? Dirksen told me, ‘Let's face it, Eisenhower did not know much about what was going on during his Administration. He would call a group in – let the others do most of the talking – he used to sit and doodle for about two hours and then he would say, “OK, boys, who is going to carry the ball?” The Senator said that it was frightening – Eisenhower 's lack of knowledge of what was taking place and the things he didn't know about the United States Government. Nixon used to call on Dirksen and ask him to speak to Eisenhower, particularly about firing Sherman Adams. But the Senator said that he told Nixon he should talk to Eisenhower, he was the Vice President, but Nixon was scared of Eisenhower period.”

“Well,” I said to Mr. Kennedy, “you and Mr. Johnson are certainly different than those two men. You certainly know what you are doing and Mr. Johnson is not afraid of you.” “No,” said Mr. Kennedy, “the only thing Mr. Johnson is afraid of is that I will not put him on the ticket in 1964.” 190-91

Access:
”According to my records, in the first year these private conferences [between President Kennedy and Vice President Johnson] added up to ten hours and nineteen minutes—by the third year they had fallen off to one hour and fifty-three minutes.” 161

Recommendation:

Lincoln provides an interesting first-hand account from one who, as JFK’s secretary (and loyal to the President), saw both men up close. Not a “must read” but a good read.